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Abstract
Performance, dependability and quality of service (QoS)
are prime aspects of the UML modelling domain. To cap-
ture these aspects effectively in the design phase, we have
recently proposed STOCHARTS, a conservative extension of
UML statechart diagrams. In this paper, we apply the STO-
CHART formalism to a safety critical design problem. We
model a part of the European Train Control System specifi-
cation, focusing on the risks of wireless communication fail-
ures in future high-speed cross-European trains. Stochastic
model checking with the model checker PROVER enables
us to derive constraints under which the central quality re-
quirements are satisfied by the STOCHART model. The pa-
per illustrates the flexibility and maturity of STOCHARTS
to model real problems in safety critical system design.
1. Introduction
The UML is pervadingmany challenging engineering ar-
eas including real-time and embedded system design. Em-
bedded systems designers are usually facing various chal-
lenges if they strive for systems with predictable quality
of service (QoS). Most QoS aspects of current embedded
systems are time-related features and properties, and are of
stochastic nature. A workable modelling and analysis ap-
proach to embedded system QoS is based on the observa-
tion that networks, interfaces, and even circuits on chips
[10, 36] can be understood and modelled as discrete sys-
tems exhibiting some form of stochastic behaviour, such as
error rates, response time distributions, or message queue
lengths.
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While in principle the UML provides the right ingredi-
ents to model discrete event dynamic systems, it lacks sup-
port for stochastic process modelling. This issue has been
addressed in both the UML profile for schedulability, per-
formance and time [38], and in the draft UML profile for
modelling QoS and fault tolerance [37]. These profiles sug-
gest annotational extensions of UML providing means to
specify performance, dependability and QoS characteristics
at various levels.
However, the vague semantics of the UML and of its
annotational extensions drastically hamper QoS analysis.
For this reason, quite some research has been devoted to
formalise QoS analysis based on the UML. Several au-
thors have suggested mappings of statechart fragments onto
stochastic Petri nets variants [6, 23, 27, 28, 31]. Others
have linked to process algebra [33, 9]. Together with Ka-
toen [26] we have recently proposed a QoS-oriented exten-
sion of UML statechart diagrams, STOCHART, which en-
hances the basic formalism with two distinguished features.
One enhancement allows state transitions to select proba-
bilistically out of different effects, much like the rolling
of a die can have one out of six effects, determined prob-
abilistically. The second extension is equally simple: The
“!"#$%” operator of statechart diagrams is given a stochastic
interpretation, allowing the use of arbitrary probability dis-
tributions for modelling, such as &'()*+ ,-./ for a neg-
ative exponential distribution with a mean of 10 min, or
0123)*+ 45*6 4/ for a uniform distribution in the inter-
val from 10 to 15 hours. The resulting statecharts dialect is
called STOCHARTS, and contains basic UML statechart di-
agrams as a subset.
To make STOCHARTS a useful tool in QoS modelling
and prediction requires more than a simple extension of
UML with an intuitive interpretation. In order to support
model-based QoS prediction, a formal mathematical inter-
pretation is indispensable. Otherwise, model-based calcu-
lations are not trustworthy. Concretely, STOCHARTS are
equipped with a rigid formal semantics. The semantics ex-
ploits lessons learned in a decade of research in formal
specification of stochastic processes, rooted in the seminal
works on stochastic Petri nets [3, 2], stochastic process al-
gebra [20, 22] and probabilistic automata [35]. In order to
associate a stochastic interpretation to collaborative collec-
tions of statechart diagrams embedded in arbitrary environ-
ments, STOCHARTS are equipped with a compositional se-
mantics, which uses concepts from Input/Output (I/O) au-
tomata [30]. The semantics associated with STOCHART is
based on the requirements-level semantics of Eshuis and
Wieringa [17], which adapts the Statemate semantics [21]
and its formalisation by Damm et al. [11] to the UML. We
are convinced that a different base semantics could have
been chosen, as our extension is more or less orthogonal
to the concepts of basic statechart diagrams.
This paper exemplifies the usefulness and maturity of
STOCHARTS on a nontrivial case study. We apply the STO-
CHART formalism to model a safety critical fragment of
the future European Train Control System (ETCS) standard.
Communication among ETCS components (trains, track-
side equipment etc.) will be based on mobile communica-
tion using GSM-R, an adaptation of the GSM protocol to
railway applications.
The safe and efficient operation of ETCS is, of course,
of prime importance. The specifications of GSM-R and of
ETCS contain various QoS requirements such as “a con-
nection must be established within 5 seconds with 95%
probability”. Due to the architecture of ETCS, on-board and
trackside data processing as well as the radio communica-
tion link are crucial factors in ensuring the ETCS require-
ments. In order to study this issue, we follow an approach
inspired by the design-by-contract paradigm [32, 7]. We
treat the GSM-R specification as a black box in our model,
only considering the QoS requirements specified for GSM-
R, which turn into worst-case QoS guarantees for the ser-
vice provided by GSM-R to the ETCS. These guarantees
are part of the STOCHART model we develop. Our analy-
sis, then, enables us to identify bounds on the distance be-
tween consecutive trains on a track, under which the cru-
cial QoS requirements of ETCS are still satisfied. The com-
putations are performed with the model-checker PROVER
[39] which implements a variation of discrete event simula-
tion to analyse the stochastic process underlying the STO-
CHART.
The STOCHART model of the ETCS communication
fragment developed in this paper is not ultimately com-
plex, and it can be extended in many interesting directions.
We believe, however, that it shows how STOCHART can be
used in a systems engineering context together with model
checking-baseddependability analysis. Our case study is in-
spired by a DSPN model proposed by Zimmermann and
Hommel [40]. Our work differs from the one considered in
[40] in a number of issues, besides the use of different mod-
elling formalisms. In particular, we provide a more faithful
modelling of the worst case GSM communication charac-
teristics, and allow for concurrent (or simultaneous) faults
of different types. On the analysis side, we use approxima-
tive stochastic model checking, as opposed to a numerical
analysis of the stochastic process underlying the DSPN. As
our (more faithful) model contains multiple concurrent non-
exponential distributions, it is not obvious how it could be
analysed numerically.
In a nutshell, the central contribution of this paper lies
in the application of STOCHARTS to a realistic, yet ab-
stract, modelling problem, where stochastic requirements
and guarantees are assessed using stochastic verification
technology.
Organisation of the paper. Section 2 introduces UML state-
chart diagrams and STOCHARTS, briefly touching upon se-
mantic issues. Section 3 introduces the ETCS problem do-
main, and describes the particular train radio signalling case
study. The STOCHARTS model and its analysis are pre-
sented in Sections 4 and 5. Section 6 discusses lessons learnt
from this case study and concludes the paper.
2. STOCHARTS
This section gives an overview on UML statechart dia-
grams and STOCHART, and reviews the semantic model un-
derlying STOCHART. We refer to [26] for a thorough dis-
cussion of the STOCHART formalism.
UML statechart diagrams. A basic UML statechart dia-
gram consists of
• a set of Nodes1 with a tree structure. Nodes are of type
‘basic’ (leaves), ‘and’ , or ‘or’. The root node and chil-
dren of and-nodes are of type ‘or’. Each or-node has a
distinguished, initial child node.
• a set of Events with the distinguished element ⊥ de-
noting “no event required”.
• a set of (typed) Variables or attributes together with an
initial valuation V0 : Vars → D, assigning initial val-
ues to the variables. Here D subsumes the domains of
all variables.
• a set of Edges. Each edge connects a set of source
nodes to a set of target nodes, and is labelled with an
event, a guard (a Boolean expression), and a (possi-
bly empty) set of actions (assignments to variables or
sending messages to other objects).
For analysis purposes, we assume that all these sets are fi-
nite.
1 The UML specification for statechart diagrams actually speaks of
states, but we prefer to call them otherwise because the system state
may consist of more than one node at the same time.
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Figure 1. Example statechart diagram
Intuitive semantics of UML statechart diagrams. The state-
chart diagram is always in some state which consists of one
or several nodes: if an and-node is part of the state, all of its
children are in the state. If an or-node is part of the state, ex-
actly one of its children is so. An edge may be taken (i. e., is
enabled) if all its source nodes are part of the current state,
its guard holds, and its event happens. The system selects as
many enabled edges as possible for execution; a choice be-
tween conflicting edges is often resolved by the UML prior-
ity scheme. Once the selected edges are taken, their source
nodes are left, their actions are executed, and their target
nodes are entered. Note that multiple edges may be taken in
a single step. To simplify the analysis, we assume that the
step is instantaneous, so that no new events will reach the
system before the step finishes.
Figure 1 contains a small example statechart diagram.
The system shows an and-node, labelled7, with two paral-
lel components, labelled & and 3. While the system is in7,
it is always in & and 3. Each of these is an or-node. While
the system is in 3, it is always in either 8 or 9. Arrows in-
dicate edges.
For this example, the semantics is as follows. The initial
state consists of the nodes :, 8, &, 3 and 7. Upon receiv-
ing event $, nodes : and 8 are left, actions ! and " are gen-
erated, ; is entered and : is re-entered. When both events
$ and " are received at once, there is a conflict: both edges
leaving node : are enabled, but only one can be taken. (The
UML semantics does not prescribe which one takes prior-
ity.)
Additional UML statechart diagram features. In addition to
the above, the UML defines many further features of state-
chart diagrams. For example, there is an !"#$%(t) operator
which can be used as a trigger for an edge; the operator in-
dicates that the edge should be taken t time units after its
source node is entered. Further, an or-node may contain a
history connectormeaning that the statechart shouldmemo-
rise which of its child nodes was active last and reenter that
child node (instead of the initial one) in case the or-node is
reentered. Finally, we will also use entry and exit actions,
i. e. actions that are executed whenever some specific node
is entered or exited. These actions are denoted with the la-
bels >. $.#%? and >. $@-# in the respective node. This and
other features can be defined as syntactic sugar.We have not
included them in the above definition for simplicity.
STOCHARTS. STOCHARTS extend UML statechart dia-
grams as follows: the “!"#$%” operator is extended to indi-
cate random delays, and the notion of edges is refined into
probabilistic edges (P-edges) to handle discrete probabilis-
tic branching.
• Like an event, the !"#$%-operator acts as a trigger of
an edge (or a P-edge). It has as parameter a cumula-
tive distribution function F where F(t) is the probabil-
ity to wait at most t time units.
• A P-edge generalises an edge such that the set of target
nodes and the actions can be chosen probabilistically.
The trigger is the same as for an edge: it has a set of
source nodes, an event or or an !"#$% operator, and a
guard. Its reaction, however, is defined by a function
assigning probabilities to pairs, consisting of a set of
actions and a set of target nodes.
The UML notion of an edge is retained by a trivial P-edge
with a single probabilistic outcome (having probability 1).
A (nontrivial) P-edge is graphically depicted in two parts:
an arrow labelled with an event and a guard directed to a
P-pseudonode (denoted (©) from which several arrows to
target nodes emanate, each labelled with a probability and
an action set. For semantic reasons, we impose a slight re-
striction on P-pseudonodes: most arrows emanating a P-
pseudonode that cross node borders are forbidden to sim-
plify the probabilistic choice (see [25, 24] for an extensive
discussion of this issue).
Intuitive semantics of STOCHARTS. Like a UML statechart
diagram, a STOCHART is always in some state. A P-edge is
enabled if all its source nodes are part of the current state,
its guard holds, and either its event happens or the delay
associated with its !"#$% operator expires. The system se-
lects as many enabled P-edges as possible for execution
and resolves the discrete probabilistic choices. Probabilis-
tic choices of P-edges are assumed to be stochastically in-
dependent. Once the selected edges are taken, their source
nodes are left, their actions are executed, and their target
nodes are entered. On entering a node with an outgoing (P-)
edge labelled with an !"#$%(F) operator, a sample is taken
from distribution F and a timer is set accordingly. The cor-
responding outgoing edge becomes enabled once the timer
expires.
Figure 2 shows a small example of a STOCHART. Node
A is the initial node. In this node, the system waits a ran-
dom time, with a mean of 10 seconds, exponentially dis-
tributed. After that, it proceeds to node B and its default
child 2. In this state, the system reacts to trigger ! by mov-
ing to node C with probability 0.1.
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Figure 2. Example STOCHART
STOCHART semantic model. The formal semantics of
STOCHARTS [26] is defined in terms of an extension of la-
belled transition systems, called stochastic I/O-automata
(IOSA, for short). Basically, an IOSA is an automaton
with locations representing the possible states of the sys-
tem, and transitions between locations representing the sys-
tem’s evolvement. These transition systems are equipped
with timers to model stochastic delays, and with a set of ac-
tions to model system activities. The use of timers in tran-
sition systems is very much in line with the use of clocks
in, e. g., timed automata [4, 29]. While clocks in timed au-
tomata run forward at the same pace and are always reset
to 0, our timers are initialised by sampling a stochastic dis-
tribution and run backwards, all at the same pace. On
the other hand, our timers are always checked for expira-
tion (i. e., is the timer equal to zero?), while clocks can be
checked against complex conditions.
Input and output actions are distinguished to al-
low for the composition of transition systems, like
in I/O-automata [30]. Three types of transition rela-
tions are used: input transitions, output transitions, and
delay transitions, the latter being enabled once a timer ex-
pires. Whereas input and delay transitions are standard
ternary relations (input is even functional), the output tran-
sition relation is probabilistic. Like in I/O-automata we
assume input-enabledness, i. e., in each location any in-
put must be accepted.
Figure 3 shows an example IOSA. It corresponds to the
parallel composition of the statechart diagram in figure 1
(which is a trivial STOCHART) with the STOCHART in fig-
ure 2. To simplify the figure, we have assumed that the sys-
tem is closed, i. e., no further external inputs reach the sys-
tem. Each state of the IOSA is drawn as a box which con-
tains the active STOCHART nodes and the events that have
been received but not yet processed. The !"#$% construct is
translated to setting a timer and waiting until it expires: in
the initial state, the timer is set according to an exponen-
tial distribution with a mean of 10 seconds. After expiration
of the timer, the event $ is generated by the STOCHART.
This triggers the statechart diagram, as described above, to
generate events ! and ". Now, event " triggers the UML stat-
echart diagram to leave and-node7 entering node ;, while
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Figure 3. Example IOSA
event ! simultaneously triggers the probabilistic choice be-
tween node 2 and C in the STOCHART. The other probability
spaces for output transitions are trivial: they assign proba-
bility 1 to a single next state.
Relation to Generalised Semi-Markov Processes (GSMP).
A IOSA is a specific semantic structure that contains ex-
actly the ingredients needed for STOCHART semantics [26].
GSMPs are a frequently found model for stochastic pro-
cesses, and often, a IOSA can be translated to a GSMP.
However, GSMPs do not allow nondeterministic choice,
and they also restrict the allowed stochastic distributions so
as to reduce the probability that two timers expire at the
same moment (introducing nondeterminism again) to zero.
The IOSA associated with the STOCHART modelling our
case study does not contain any nondeterminism and there-
fore allows GSMP-based analysis.
3. ETCS radio connection dependability
This section presents the high-speed train radio sig-
nalling case study we consider, which is inspired by work
of Zimmermann and Hommel [40].
European Train Control System. The upcoming European
Train Control Systems (ETCS) serves as a unifying standard
of many European railways. It is promoted by the European
Union to simplify access to and cross-border traffic between
different national rail networks. The main constituent is a
uniform communication infrastructure across Europe. This
communication infrastructure is based on GSM-R, which is
an adaptation of the well-known GSM protocol for wire-
less communications to railway specific applications. For
example, while shunting (moving wagons to compose new
trains), often a couple of wagons are pushed and a shunt-
ing worker needs to guide the train driver in real-time. Tai-
lored to this case, GSM-R specifies a “link assurance sig-
nal” which confirms to the driver that the voice communi-
cation link exists.
The specifications of GSM-R and of ETCS contain sev-
eral quality-of-service requirements. In the case study we
consider, we focus on the reliability of the communication
between the train and the trackside control authority and as-
sess the impact communication delays may have on safety
distances between consecutive trains.
ETCS levels. ETCS knows multiple levels to enable grad-
ual migration from the current systems. At all levels, so-
called Eurobalises are used. A Eurobalise is a transponder
that sends a message to a train passing over it. At level
1, this is the main communication medium; among oth-
ers, Eurobalises are used to ensure mutually exclusive ac-
cess to track segments. They transmit so called movement
authorities and other information on danger points to the
train, similar to current systems that warn the train driver
when approaching a danger point. A movement authority
grants the train exclusive access to a track segment ahead
of the train, called a track block. At levels 2 and 3, GSM-
R-based radio communication is used for transmitting both
track-specific information as well as movement authorities,
while Eurobalises are only used for exact position measure-
ment. At these levels, the dispatching centre that assigns
movement authorities to trains is called radio block cen-
tre (RBC). Levels 2 and 3 differ by how the integrity of the
train is checked. At level 2, traditional track-side axle coun-
ters or rail circuits are in use, being installed along the track
at regular intervals. They form boundaries of fixed blocks,
which at any time can only be used by one particular train,
namely the one which possesses the movement authority
for the block. Level 3 trains instead are equipped with an
on-board integrity checking device. This enables the sys-
tem to declare the track behind the train clear with virtu-
ally no delay, which in turn is a requirement for so-called
moving-block operation, where the track block granted ex-
clusively to a specific train is not a fixed unit of the track
between two axle counters, but instead moves with the train
along the track.
Headway. This moving-block operation is expected to re-
duce the headway, i. e., the time between the passage of con-
secutive trains at some point of the track, well below 3 min-
utes, which is the usual headway in fixed block operation.
The minimal headway is the sum of several delays (in this
calculation, we assume trains running at 300 km/h): a delay
needed for train integrity check (< 4 seconds), the commu-
nication delay itself, and a delay that reflects certain phys-
ical distances: (i) train length (typical value: 400 m), (ii)
braking distance (about 2500 m), (iii) margin for position
measurement errors (5%). The latter is at most 50 m, if Eu-
robalises are positioned no more than 1 km apart. For sim-
plicity, we assume that these distances sum up to 3000 m.
The train travels this distance in 36 seconds. Thus, with con-
tinuous instant communication, 40 seconds would be the ul-
timate lower bound on the headway between consecutive
trains.
In this case study, we will have a closer look at the reli-
ability of communication needed for moving-block opera-
tion. GSM-R may fail to establish a connection, a connec-
tion may get degraded or lost; messages may get delayed
during handover from one GSM radio cell to another. Un-
der normal circumstances, the train reports the safe posi-
tion of its head and tail at fixed intervals, for example every
5 seconds. What happens if one or several of these reports
get lost? On the other hand, movement authorities need to
be transmitted to the train at similar intervals. What is the
probability that the train misses a movement authority?
Assumptions. We assume that the GSM-R network func-
tions as specified in the Euroradio specification [18, 40]. In
particular, we assume:
• The delay to establish a GSM-R connection is at most
5 seconds with 95% and at most 7.5 seconds with
99.9% probability. Delays of more than 7.5 seconds
are regarded as connection establishment errors.
• The end-to-end delay of a (short) message is at most
0.5 sec with 95%, at most 1.2 sec with 99% and at
most 2.4 sec with 99.99% probability.
• Handover takes place whenever the train passes from
one GSM radio cell to another. As ETCS is intended to
work with train speeds up to 500 km/h, we take a pes-
simistic assumption on the time between handovers.
The mean distance between handovers is specified to
be 7 km; this leads to a mean time between cell han-
dovers of 50 seconds. The communication break dur-
ing handover lasts at most 0.3 sec.
• From time to time, the train may pass an area where
communication is degraded and frequent transmission
errors occur. These periods are more than 7 seconds
apart with 95% probability. A degraded period is re-
quired to be shorter than 1 second with 95% probabil-
ity.
• A connection loss has a probability< 10–4 per hour. It
shall be detected within 1 sec.
With respect to the train-specific behaviour, we adhere to
the following assumptions as put forward in [19, 34]:
• A passenger train completes an integrity check within
4 seconds; it reports the outcome and its position to the
RBC at most once in 5 seconds.
• A typical train trip has a duration of 1 hour.
Our Focus. We view all the above properties as constraints
to be met by the environment in which a level 3 train oper-
ates. This view can be seen as an application of the design-
by-contract paradigm [32, 7], in the sense that the ETCS
system is required to work properly if these constraints are
met (or outbalanced). The question then remains what spe-
cific guarantees can be distilled from these assumptions.
We intend to check whether it is possible that trains run at
300 km/h with only a small headway (about 1 minute). In
particular, we want to find answers to the following ques-
tions:
• The probability p that a message is transmitted suc-
cessfully has to be at least 99.95%. This figure is based
on the availability requirement of [18]. As parts of the
communication delay are distributed stochastically, the
success probability depends on the time frame t we al-
low as maximal communication delay. Recall that the
minimal headway with (hypothetic) instant commu-
nication is 40 seconds. With a 1 minute headway in
mind, the question is: Is the probability p > 99.95%
for t = 20?
• Even if 20 seconds lead to p being in the range required
above (≥ 99.95%), it is still not obvious that this also
enables trains to run at a headway of about 1 minute
for a full hour. We therefore also consider the ques-
tion: What is the probability that two trains run for a
complete trip with a small headway without ever brak-
ing or stopping?
4. StoChart model
To assess the questions raised above, we have devel-
oped a STOCHARTS model of the ETCS case. The model
has been built in a systematic and incremental way, start-
ing from the most basic operation, which represents a sim-
plified view on the normal operation. After that, we added
processing of failures one by one. In our subsystem, there
are two relevant components: the train and the radio block
centre.
Figure 4 shows the train model. In node M$N>%#-.O N>P
E-#->., a position report is prepared every 5 seconds, indi-
cated by the !"#$% edge with a deterministic delay. It is sent
as soon as possible, if the train assumes there is a connec-
tion to the RBC. The node 8>..$F#->. E#!#QE just stores
the information the train has about the connection: it is ei-
ther disconnected (the initial node, where it tries to estab-
lish a connection by sending event #%?), connected normally
or involved in a cell handover.
There are several causes for delay and stochasticity in the
communication protocol between train and RBC. We have
decided to incorporate these delays into the model of the
RBC, while the train model is reactive, waiting for stim-
uli from the RBC. For example, to model the establish-
ment phase for a radio connection, the RBC model includes
!"#$%D. . .G operators and sends a message to the train sys-
tem when the connection is established. Alternatively, we
could have split the communication characteristics from the
RBC channel management, and let the train and RBC inter-
act through this third submodel.
Figure 5 shows the RBC model together with the delays.
When the train tries to establish a connection with the RBC
(by sending event #%?), the connection establishment delay
starts. It is guaranteed to be at most 5 seconds with 95%
probability and at most 7.5 seconds with another 4.9%. We
have modelled this guarantee using two deterministic de-
lays, one of length 5 sec (on the edge leaving node F>.P
.$F#-.O *), the other one of length 2.5; Alternatively, we
could have modelled it using a single more complex distri-
bution.
Actually, the node F>..$F#$J contains a subchart to
model the communication delay (0.5 seconds with 95%
probability, 1.2 with 99% probability, 2.4 with 99.99%
probability). This subchart is similar to the model for the
connection establishment delay. In order not to clutter the
pictorial representation of the STOCHART this subchart is
omitted from figure 5, but it is part of the model we study.
This basic model of the RBC reflects normal operation.
To this, we have added three relevant possibilities of per-
turbations. During the design of our model, they have been
added one after another: (i) During cell handover, the con-
nection is lost for at most 0.3 sec. As argued above, the con-
nection between RBC and (moving) train is subject to a cell
handover about once in 50 seconds. This is modelled in the
subnodes of node F>%%$F#. The cell handover is visible for
the train (via events F4 E# and F4 $.). (ii)Due to signal ob-
struction, transmission errors are common in wireless com-
munication, but error correcting codes make it possible to
correct certain limited amounts of bit-errors. However pe-
riods of frequent transmission errors may occur, making it
impossible to recover sent messages from the received bit-
stream. In our model, this is reflected by node $%%>% RQ%E#.
Both the beginning and the end of the error burst period are
modelled by exponential delays, as the errors occur stochas-
tically. The mean times of the relevant delays are chosen
as to meet the requirements given above. The node $%%>%
RQ%E# may be entered from either node in the or-node F>%P
%$F#. In particular, we assume that if an error burst occurs
during cell handover, the latter is aborted, and node F>.P
.$F#$J is reentered once the burst is over. As another pos-
sibility, we could have modelled that the error burst main-
tains the node identity inside F>%%$F#. We discuss this alter-
native in Section 6. (iii)All other failure types are subsumed
under connection loss, which is required to happen at most
10–4 times per hour. We have modelled this by an exponen-
tial delay with an average of 104 hours. The train notices
the connection loss with a delay; this is modelled by wait-
ing in node Q.J$#$F#$J F>..$F#->. K>EE for 1 second.
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Figure 4. The train model
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Figure 5. The radio block centre model, including error models
5. Analysis of the example
Model analysis of a collection of STOCHARTS is based
on the analysis of the associated IOSA. This model can be
analysed using simulation, or using model-checking. In the
most general case model-checking algorithms in the style
of [13] are needed. If nondeterminism is absent (which is
the case in our example), one can deal with algorithms for
GSMPs, such as the ones implemented in PROVER [39].
This tool uses discrete event simulation to estimate prob-
abilities of interesting system behaviours, similar to vari-
ous other tools for GSMP analysis. PROVER is, however,
particular in the manner the behaviour-of-interest is speci-
fied by the user. It allows to specify two types of require-
ments. First, PROVER can estimate the probability with
which certain path-based system requirements are satisfied
by the model. These requirements are stated as path proper-
ties in the stochastic temporal logic CSL [5]. Second, PRO-
VER can also be used similar to a model checker to ver-
ify whether a CSL state property is met by the model. So,
the main differences to other simulation tools lies in the fact
that requirements are specified as CSL properties, and that
it can be used to verify (or refute these requirements). We
have chosen PROVER because this type of verification fits
well in the design-by-contract paradigm we follow, provid-
ing (probabilistic) guarantees on the design under consider-
ation. This choice, however, is not in the heart of the STO-
CHART approach, we could equally well have been taken
another more standard discrete-event simulation package.
Experiments. The IOSA models associated with the STO-
CHART specifications were generated in a semi-automatic
way, and manually translated into the input format of PRO-
VER. All experiments were performed on a Dell Latitude
D600with 1 GBmemory and a processor speed of 1.7 GHz.
We have analysed the following two variants of train com-
munication:
• A simple version of the system, with a single train and
a communication link as shown in the STOCHARTS.
In this setting, we assume that the train generates a po-
sition report every 5 seconds and sends it off to the
RBC once it assumes the connection is working. We
have checked whether the communication is reliable
enough, depending on the delay between the reception
of successive position reports. Recall that the probabil-
ity that a message is received is required to be at least
99.95%. Stated as a CSL property, the requirement is:
P≥0.9995(&≤t,$EE!O$ %$F$-S$J)
We should check this property in the state where a
position report has just been generated, sent and re-
ceived without delay (an over-approximation of the
best-case behaviour for the preceding message). PRO-
VER has checked the property (in what we have called
themodel-checker like mode above) for t= 20 seconds
(5 seconds delay between successive position reports
plus 15 seconds communication delay) and produced
the result: the success probability p is ≥ 0.9995 with
a confidence > 0.9999. PROVER runtime was 21 sec-
onds.
In addition, we used the tool to estimate the prob-
ability p that the communication succeeds within at
most t seconds. The table below gives the estimates.
t p error estimate runtime
10 0.98267 ±9 ·10–5 1 min 36 s
15 0.999700 ±9 ·10–6 2 min 16 s
20 0.9999944 ±6 ·10–7 14 min 18 s
25 0.99999995 ±5 ·10–8 26 min 53 s
We can see that even for t = 15 seconds, the suc-
cess probability would have been large enough. Check-
ing the above CSL property again with this parameter
value shows that also for t = 15 seconds, the success
probability p is ≥ 0.9995 with a confidence> 0.9999.
However, PROVER needed 55 seconds; this indicates
that more samples had to be generated to verify the
property.
• Amodel for two successive trains running at 300 km/h.
In this setting, we assume that the train in front sends
a position and integrity report to the RBC, which in
turn sends a movement authority to the following train.
The delay between two receptions of a movement au-
thority is required to be not too long, to avoid that the
following train needs to brake. On the other hand, as
the above experiments have shown, this delay can be
more than 10 seconds with a non-neglectable proba-
bility. The model for the second radio link (from RBC
to the following train) is the same as for the first one;
therefore, we omit the STOCHARTS for this link.
With PROVER, it is difficult to measure the age of
the information on which the movement authority re-
ceived is based. Therefore, we measure the time∆t be-
tween two successive receptions of movement author-
ities. A simple calculation shows that then, the second
movement authority is based on information not older
than ∆t + 7.4 seconds. With a headway of slightly
above one minute, namely 62.4 seconds, a maximum
∆t of 15 seconds is fine. Otherwise, the following train
will have to brake at least once during the trip. PRO-
VER provides us with the following results:
max∆t p error estimate runtime
> 10 0.9562 ±9 ·10–4 17 min 34 s
> 15 0.101 ±2 ·10–3 27 min 5 s
> 20 0.0036 ±4 ·10–4 35 min 55 s
> 25 0.00034 ±11 ·10–5 39 min 28 s
We can see that about one train out of 9 or 10 would
have to brake because of a communication failure.
However, in most cases, the failure is short, and the
train could recover after a very short braking period.
We can conclude that the ETCS radio link is reliable
enough to run trains with a headway of just above
1 minute.
If trains are scheduled at a larger headway, one
might try and relax some of the QoS assumptions on
the GSM-R network. For example, telecom operators
typically assume a higher connection loss probability
than 10–4 per hour for traditional GSM networks. Re-
laxing these QoS assumptions may allow for a cheaper
GSM-R infrastructure.
6. Discussion
This section provides a discussion of our experiences
when modelling and analysing the ETCS case with STO-
CHARTS and PROVER.
STOCHARTS and ETCS. We have given a detailed descrip-
tion of our efforts to model the a safety critical applica-
tion with a UML-based stochastic modelling language. In
a nutshell, we have studied the circumstances under which
high-speed trains may follow each other with a headway of
about 1 minute while driving with 300 km/h, without run-
ning a substantial risk that wireless communication faults
may cause them to brake. This observation may lead to a
better utilisation of European railtracks as traditional head-
ways are about 3 minutes.
Our results seemingly contradict what is reported in [40],
where the probability that a train may need to stop because
of a communication failure may be as high as 94%. We
mention however that we use an approximately three times
longer value for the additional headway, and use a more
faithful model of communication delays. Therefore, the two
analysis results are uncomparable.
History connector of UML statechart diagrams. On the
modelling side, some of our choices eased modelling with
the basic concepts of UML statechart diagrams. In particu-
lar, we have assumed that if an error burst occurs during cell
handover, the latter is aborted, and the initial node is reen-
tered once the burst is over. As another possibility, we could
have modelled that the error burst maintains the node iden-
tity inside the embracing or-node. One of the possibilities
to achieve this with UML notation is provided by a his-
tory connector (denoted A©) which indicates that the sub-
statechart should memorise which of its child nodes was
active last and reenter that child node (instead of the initial
one) in case the or-node is reentered. This however raises
the question how to handle the time that has elapsed in this
node prior to leaving it. In our stochastic timed interpreta-
tion, this opens a field of interpretation which closely re-
sembles the firing or execution policy issue in non-Markov
stochastic Petri nets [1, 8, 15] and activity networks. We in-
deed believe that the history connector needs to be consid-
ered parametric in this policy.
Tool support. The design of STOCHART is supported by
the general editing tool TCM [16]. However, when it comes
to the derivation of the underlying IOSA, and then to the re-
sulting GSMP, several steps are still done manually. This is
unsatisfactory, because this manual process is both cumber-
some and error-prone. We are exploring ways to effectively
implement the operational semantics of STOCHART. Apart
from a direct implementation along the lines of [26, 24], we
are also considering a translational semantics, which maps a
collection of STOCHARTS to the MODEST language [12].
Such a link enables mechanisation of the stochastic analysis
of STOCHARTS, because MODEST is connected to the dis-
crete event simulation engine of the MO¨BIUS toolset [14].
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